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Abstract—With the rapid growth of Android malware, many
machine learning-based malware analysis approaches are pro-
posed to mitigate the severe phenomenon. However, such
classifiers are opaque, non-intuitive, and difficult for analysts
to understand the inner decision reason. For this reason, a
variety of explanation approaches are proposed to interpret
predictions by providing important features. Unfortunately, the
explanation results obtained in the malware analysis domain
cannot achieve a consensus in general, which makes the analysts
confused about whether they can trust such results. In this work,
we propose principled guidelines to assess the quality of five
explanation approaches by designing three critical quantitative
metrics to measure their stability, robustness, and effectiveness.
Furthermore, we collect five widely-used malware datasets and
apply the explanation approaches on them in two tasks, including
malware detection and familial identification. Based on the
generated explanation results, we conduct a sanity check of
such explanation approaches in terms of the three metrics. The
results demonstrate that our metrics can assess the explanation
approaches and help us obtain the knowledge of most typical
malicious behaviors for malware analysis.
Keywords-Android malware, Explanation approaches, Stabil-
ity, Robustness, Effectiveness
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of Android malware has posed sig-
nificant threats to smartphone users [1]. To mitigate the
severe phenomenon, many malware analysis approaches are
proposed in recent years, especially the machine learning-
based approaches. They first train a classifier using a labeled
dataset and then use it for two main tasks, i.e., malware
detection (detecting whether a given sample is malicious
or benign) [2], [3] and familial identification (identifying
which family a detected malware belongs to) [4], [5]. The
experimental results conducted by such work demonstrate that
they can achieve fairly good performance.
However, the constructed classifier model seems like a
black-box to the security analysts, since it cannot provide
clear evidence to explain why the given sample is identified
as a malicious sample or not. Note that it is difficult for
analysts to manually analyze the black-box model and infer
the decision reason because the size of the training data and
the complexity of the learned model are too big for humans
to understand [6]. Furthermore, existing approaches reveal
that the learned models can be easily attacked by adversarial
samples [7], which would even increase the difficulty of
malware analysis. As a result, the analysts cannot determine
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the traditional machine learning process
and the interpretable machine learning process.
whether they could trust the decisions, and they are hesitated
to adopt the theoretical approaches into practical applications.
In order to make users trust the machine learning-based
approaches, a variety of explanation approaches have been
developed recently to interpret predictions by providing
important features. Fig. 1 presents two different decision
pipelines between the traditional classifier and constructed
interpreter. For the former pipeline, the user is confused about
why the input sample is detected as malicious. For the latter
pipeline, after the applying of explanation approach on the
classifier model, the interpreter is capable of providing specific
reasons for particular machine decisions.
Most prominent of these explanation approaches include
local, model-agnostic ones [8]–[12] that focus on explaining
individual predictions for a given black-box classifier. The
basic idea of these explanation approaches is to approximate
the local decision boundary using a linear model to infer
the important features of the current input instance. Such
explanation features can be leveraged by analysts to digest the
security analysis results [13], debug pre-trained models [14],
and detect adversarial input [15]. The developed explanation
approaches seem like the keys to open the black-box model
and infer the mechanism of decision-making.
Unfortunately, we find that the explanation results provided
by existing explanation approaches cannot achieve a consensus
in general (we illustrate a motivation example in Section
II for details), which makes the analysts confused about
whether they can trust the explanation results. Meanwhile, to
the best of our knowledge, there is only a little reliability
analysis work of these explanation approaches [16]–[18].
Adebayo et al. [16] proposed an actionable methodology
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
05
89
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
3 A
ug
 20
20
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. X, NO. X, X 2
based on randomization tests to evaluate the adequacy of
explanation approaches. Their results find that some widely
deployed saliency approaches are independent of both the
data the model was trained on and the model parameters.
Yeh et al. [17] proposed two objective evaluation metrics,
naturally termed infidelity and sensitivity, for machine learning
explanations. Camburu et al. [18] introduced an off-the-shelf
evaluation test for post-hoc explanation approaches under
the feature-selection perspective. However, there are three
main limitations to directly apply these approaches to the
Android malware analysis domain. First, the work [16], [17]
mainly focus on the evaluation of explanation approaches
that are designed for the CNNs in the image classification
domain. Such approaches require the gradient information
of the white-box classifier, and their generalization ability is
limited. Second, the work [18] proposes two specific metrics
that require the ground truth labeled by humans, which is not
suitable for our work. Third, the existing proposed metrics
are general evaluation properties, while in this work, we need
more critical metrics that are available in all cases and in a
reasonable time.
To evaluate the reliability problem of explanation ap-
proaches in the critical domain of Android malware analysis,
in this paper, we investigate their availability by making the
following contributions:● We propose principled guidelines to assess the quality
of the explanation approaches by designing three quanti-
tative metrics to measure their stability, robustness, and
effectiveness, which are fundamental properties that an
explanation approach should satisfy for critical security
tasks.● We apply the explanation approaches in Android malware
analysis, including malware detection and familial iden-
tification, and conduct a sanity check of such approaches
in terms of the three proposed metrics. To the best of
our knowledge, this study is the first work attempting to
provide a systematized investigation about the availability
of explanation approaches on malware analysis.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section II provides the motivating scenario and the explanation
approaches evaluated in our work. Section III details the data
collection and the three proposed metrics. Section IV reports
our study results. After discussing the results and the threats to
validity in Section V, we introduce the related work in Section
VI and concludes this paper in Section VII.
II. MOTIVATION AND EXPLANATION APPROACHES
A. Motivating Scenario
Let us consider a security analyst who detects malware
samples by using a machine learning-based approach. Based
on the trained classifier, he feeds the new coming samples
to the classifier and gets predicted labels, i.e., malicious or
benign. However, the black-box classifier model lacks an
explanation for the decision-making. Thus, he tries to leverage
the existing explanation approaches to obtain important
features of the current input sample. Fig. 2 presents the
explanation results for an app that is predicted as a malware
Permission: READ_SMS, -0.0854
Permission: CHANGE_WIFI_STATE, 0.0351
Permission: SEND_SMS, -0.0296
API: android.telephony.TelephonyManager:getLine1Number, 0.0261
API: android.location.LocationManager:getLastKnownLocation, -0.0247
API: android.webkit.WebView:loadData = False AND
API: android.telephony.TelephonyManager:getLine1Number =True AND
Permission: GET_ACCOUNTS = False AND
API: android.telephony.gsm.GsmCellLocation:getCid = True
API: android.app.Activity:onCreateView = False AND
API: android.telephony.TelephonyManager:getSubscriberId =True AND
API: android.widget.Sniner:onClick = False AND
Permission: READ_PHONE_STATE = True AND
API: android.view.Display:getMetrics = False AND
API: android.webkit.WebView:loadUrl = False AND
API: android.app.Dialog:setContentView = False
API: android.telephony.TelephonyManager:getSubscriberId, 0.0234
Intent: ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED, 0.0181
API: android.telephony.TelephonyManager:getDeviceId, 0.01327
Permission: READ_SMS, 0.0110
API: android.view.ViewGroup:addView, -0.0109
Explanation Results of LIME
Explanation Results of Anchor
Explanation Results of LORE
Explanation Results of SHAP
Permission: READ_SMS, 0.2553
Permission: SEND_SMS, 0.2512
API: android.widget.PopupWindow:setContentView, 0.2243
API: android.view.Display:getMetrics, 0.2154
API: android.telephony.gsm.SmsManager:sendTextMessage, 0.2150
Explanation Results of LEMNA
Fig. 2: Five explanation results for a same app with the same
classifier using LIME, Anchor, LORE, SHAP, and LEMNA.
by the same classifier using five different local and model-
agnostic explanation approaches, i.e., LIME [8], Anchor [9],
LORE [10], SHAP [11], and LEMNA [12]. The descriptions
of these approaches will be introduced later. Note that both
LIME, SHAP, and LEMNA provide a parameter to control
the number of output explanation features. However, for
Anchor and LORE, their explanation results are represented
as rules, and their feature numbers differ with inputs rather
than controlled by users.
In Fig. 2, the explanation results of LIME, SHAP, and
LEMNA contain five features when the parameter value is
set as five by the analyst. However, the explanation results of
Anchor and LORE contain seven and four rules, respectively.
Note that the numbers behind the explanation features in Fig.
2 denote their corresponding weights. We observe that the
explanation results for the five approaches are quite different.
For example, there is no common feature for the results
of Anchor and LORE. Moreover, for LIME, the feature
READ_SMS shows a positive effect on the prediction of a
malicious label, but for SHAP, the same feature shows a
negative effect on the same label prediction.
The above observation makes the analyst confused. He
would wonder which explanation approach he should choose,
and can he trust the explanation results? Since there is little
standard criterion for measuring explanation approaches in
Android malware analysis, such a scenario strongly motivates
us to conduct an evaluation study on existing explanation
approaches about their availability in this critical domain.
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B. Explanation Approaches
The descriptions of the above explanation approaches are
listed below:
LIME is proposed by Ribeiro et. al [8], of which the
intuition is that the explanation can be derived locally from
the samples generated randomly in the neighborhood of the
input sample, and weighted according to their proximity to
it. Specifically, for a given sample x, it first creates a set
of perturbations of x by setting some values of x randomly.
The set is denoted as D(x) = {x′1, . . . , x′t}. Based on
the given model, it can obtain the corresponding labels of
each perturbation sample. Then, it approximates the decision
boundary using the model below:
arg min
g∈G
t∑
i=1dif(x,x′i)(f(x′i) − g(x′i))2 +Ω(g) (1)
where G denotes the set of all linear function and dif(x,x′i)
indicates the difference between the given sample x and a
perturbation sample x′. Ω(g) is a penalty term that measures
the complexity of explanation results, and it can be the number
of non-zero for linear models. Finally, LIME calculates
the weights to denote the feature importance by the Lasso
algorithm [19].
Anchor is also proposed by Ribeiro et. al [9], which
extracts if-then rules as local interpretations. Anchor uses a
bandit algorithm that randomly constructs the anchors with the
highest coverage and precision threshold, of which an anchor
explanation is a decision rule that sufficiently ties a prediction
locally such that changes to the rest of the feature values do not
matter. Specifically, the approach first creates a rule A(x) (a
set of feature predicates) that is a sufficient condition for f(x)
with high probability. Given a sample x and its perturbation
set D(x), A is defined as an anchor if
prec(A) = ED(x′∣A)[1f(x)=f(x′)] ≥ pi (2)
where D(x′∣A) denotes the conditional distribution when the
rule A applies. pi is the desired level of precision. Since there
might exist multiple anchors that are able to meet this criterion,
the approach selects the anchor with the largest coverage of
perturbation samples as the final explanation for x.
LORE is proposed by Guidoti et. al [10], which takes
the similar way to interpret the machine learning models
like Anchor. However, there are two main differences. First,
LORE generates perturbation samples in the vicinity of x using
genetic algorithm. The perturbation samples are composed
of two parts, the set D= = {x′∣f(x) = f(x′)} and the set
D≠ = {x′∣f(x) ≠ f(x′)}. The algorithm calculates the two
sets by maximizing the following two fitness functions:
fitnessx=(x′) = If(x)=f(x′) + (1 − dif(x,x′)) − Ix=x′ (3)
fitnessx≠(x′) = If(x)≠f(x′) + (1 − dif(x,x′)) − Ix=x′ (4)
where Itrue = 1 and Ifalse = 0. Then, LORE trains a decision
tree using the two sets to extract a logic rule to explain why
x is labeled as a specific class.
SHAP is proposed by Lundberg and Lee [11], which
focuses on local linear interpretable methods. SHAP follows
a similar approach as LIME but uses the SHAP kernel as a
TABLE I: Notations and definitions
Notation Definition
xi ∈ Rd the d-dimensional feature vector of the i-th sample
yi, yˆi ∈ C true label and predicted labelof the i-th sample, C denotes the label set
f a classifier model constructed on a training dataset
m an explanation approach
g =m(f) specific interpreter constructed based onan explanation method m and a trained classifier f
ei(g) the explanation results of the i-th sample with interpreter g
stb(m,T ) stability of explanation approach m on testing dataset T
rob(m,T ) robustness of explanation approach m on testing dataset T
eff(m,T ) effectiveness of explanation approach m on testing dataset T
weighting function, which creates SHAP values when solving
the regression. Specifically, for LIME, the Ω(g) is the number
of non-zero weights in the linear model, and dif(x,x′)
is obtained based on cosine distance. SHAP grounds these
definitions in game-theoretic principles to guarantee that the
explanations satisfy certain desired properties, including local
accuracy, missingness, and consistency.
LEMNA is proposed by Guo et. al [12], which is designed
to handle feature dependency and handle nonlinear local
boundaries. It leverages a mixture regression model for
approximation, which is a weighted sum of M linear models:
f(x) = M∑
j=1 θj(βjx + j) (5)
where M denotes the model numbers, and θ denotes the
weights for each model. The variables  originate from a
normal distribution. The variables βj are the regression co-
efficients that can be interpreted as M linear approximations.
In addition to the above five explanation approaches,
there are many other ones, such as input perturbation based
approaches and back propagation based approaches, which
will be introduced in the related work.
In this work, we conduct our study on the above five post-
hoc explanation approaches because of two main reasons.
First, they are model-agnostic approaches. Unlike the other
explanation approaches that can only be applied in specific
models such as CNN or GNN, the five approaches studied
in this work are more suitable for the malware analysis
domain since most malware analysis approaches still rely
on conventional machine learning algorithms. Second, they
are local interpretability methods, which are suitable for
explaining the decision-making of why a target sample is
malicious. Combining the two requirements, we select the five
approaches.
C. Basic Notations
In this section, we introduce a set of basic notations used
in our paper, which are listed in Table I, as well as their
definitions. The notations are categorized into three groups
listed below.
Malware Classifier: Given a set of training samples, each
sample xi is represented as a d-dimensional feature vector
xi ∈ Rd, a classifier f can be constructed on the dataset with
a specific machine learning algorithm. We use f(xi) = yˆi to
denote the prediction process of the i-th sample. The classifier
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. X, NO. X, X 4
would conduct a correct classification if the predicted label yˆi
equals to the true label yi. Note that for malware detection
task, the label set C contains only two elements, i.e., benign
and malicious. However, for the familial identification task, the
element in C denotes the family name, such as adrd, genimi,
and droidkungfu.
Interpreter: An interpreter g = m(f) here is generated by
applying an explanation approach m on a specific pre-trained
classifier f . Given a test sample xi, the interpreter g will output
its explanation result ei(g), which is represented as a sorted
set of features that are ranked based on their importance to
the decision result.
Quantitative Metrics: For convenience we use stb(m,T ),
rob(m,T ), and eff(m,T ) to denote the stability, robust-
ness, and effectiveness of an explanation approach m on a
testing dataset T , respectively. The values of stability and
effectiveness range from 0 to 1, while the value of robustness
ranges from -1 to 1. Here a higher value indicates a better
explainability. The detail calculation of the three metrics will
be introduced in Section III.
III. STUDY DESIGN
In study design, we first introduce the data collection
procedure that contains the construction of datasets used
for malware detection and familial identification, and the
extraction of useful features from the APK files. Then we
detail the intuitions of the three proposed quantitative metrics,
as well as their calculation equations.
A. Data Collection
Dataset Construction: Five widely-used malware datasets
are evaluated in our work. They are provided by Genome
project [1], Drebin [20], FalDroid [21], RmvDroid [22] and
AMD [23]1. For convenience, they are named as dataset-
I, dataset-II, dataset-III, dataset-IV and dataset-V. Their
descriptions are listed in Table II, where columns 2-3 list
the number of families and the number of malware samples,
columns 4-6 list the maximum, minimum, and average size
of samples, and column 7 lists the producing time of the
corresponding samples. Note that the authors of dataset-V
select three samples as representatives from each malware
family to conduct in-depth manual analysis. Therefore, their
analysis result can be regarded as the ground truth to check
the accuracy of the explanation results.
Each sample has been attached to a family label given
by experts, and they are widely-used as the ground truth
for malware analysis. For the dataset-I provided by Genome
project, all the samples were manually analyzed by Jiang
and Zhou [1], so well as their family labels. Specifically,
they labeled the malware samples according to their malicious
activities. For example, the samples in GingerMaster family
generally get root permissions, steal sensitive information, and
then send it to a remote server. For the other four datasets, their
1The original AMD dataset contains 24,650 samples, which is a time-
consuming job to calculate the explanation results for all samples. Therefore,
we randomly select one-fifth samples from each family.
TABLE II: Descriptions of five widely-used malware datasets.
Dataset #Family #Malware Max. Min. Avg. Time
dataset-I [1] 49 1,260 15.4MB 12KB 1.3MB 2011–2012
dataset-II [20] 179 5,560 24.8MB 5KB 1.3MB 2011–2014
dataset-III [21] 36 8,407 36.2MB 12KB 2MB 2013–2014
dataset-VI [22] 56 9,133 76.1MB 48KB 4.8MB 2014–2018
dataset-V [23] 71 4,741 47.2MB 9.8KB 2.1MB 2010–2016
TABLE III: Descriptions of the datasets used for malware
detection (MD) and familial identification (FI).
Dataset Training Testing #Label#Malware #Benign #Malware #Benign
MD-I 633 5,000 627 5,000 2
MD-II 2,774 5000 2,786 5,000 2
MD-III 4,194 5,000 4,213 5,000 2
MD-IV 4,554 5,000 4,579 5,000 2
MD-V 2,353 5,000 2,388 5,000 2
FI-I 633 - 627 - 49
FI-II 2,774 - 2,786 - 179
FI-III 4,194 - 4,213 - 36
FI-IV 4,554 - 4,579 - 56
FI-V 2,355 - 2,388 - 71
malware samples are labeled based on VirusTotal [24], which
is a system with more than 50 anti-virus scanners (e.g., AVL,
McAfee, and ESET-NOD32). Given a malware sample, each
anti-virus scanner will return a family label. However, there
are two issues for these anti-virus scanners. First, the family
labels given by different scanners are not always the same
(e.g., Plankton/Plangton/planktonc). Second, the results of the
scanners rarely reach a consensus. To address these issues, the
authors of the four datasets initially constructed a family label
dictionary. Then, they labeled the malware with the family
name that is agreed by more than half of the scanners.
For benign apps, we construct a benign dataset that contains
10,000 samples that are collected from Google Play [25]. Each
sample has been uploaded to the VirusTotal [24] to ensure that
all scanners report it as benign.
There are two malware analysis tasks, i.e., malware detec-
tion and familial identification. The former is a binary classi-
fication problem, and the latter is a multi-class classification
problem. For malware detection, we first mix each malware
dataset with the benign dataset and obtain five mixed datasets.
Then we randomly split each mixed dataset into two parts,
one is used for training, and the other one is used for testing.
For familial identification, half of the samples in each family
are used for training, and the remaining samples are used for
testing. The constructed datasets used for malware detection
and familial identification are listed in Table III. Here the
training size and testing size are not equal because if a family
contains only one sample, we put it in the training dataset, and
if the sample size of a family is odd, we put the extra sample
in the testing dataset.
Feature Extraction: Unlike the inartificial word features
used for text classification and the pixel features used for
image recognition, the features used for malware analysis are
manually designed by researchers. Note that in this work, our
goal is not to propose a novel malware analysis feature that
achieves better performance than state-of-the-art approaches.
We aim to conduct an assessment of the quality of different
explanation approaches in Android malware analysis. Thus,
we rely on the 295 features provided by FeatureSmith [26],
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which consists of 259 application programming interface
(API) calls, 33 permissions2, and 3 intents3. Note that
such features are collected in published knowledge, e.g.,
scientific papers, and each one contains a set of related
informative behaviors, based on which we can provide
more comprehensible explanations. For example, the API
getSimOperatorName is related to the semantic behaviors
of “return privacy-sensitive information” and “leak to remote
web server”.
To construct the feature vectors for each app, we first lever-
age the mature disassembling tools, such as apktool [27],
to obtain the AndroidManifest.xml file and the Dalvik
code from the APK files. The AndroidManifest.xml file
contains essential information about an app to the Android
system, including the requested permissions and intents.
Moreover, we can identify the used API calls by scanning the
Dalvik code files. It is worth noting that the widely-used third-
party and advertisement libraries might affect the performance
of malware analysis, so well as the explanation results. We
filter out these libraries from the Dalvik code with the blacklist
provided by existing approaches [28], [29]. For each feature, if
an app contains it, then the corresponding feature value is set
as 1; otherwise, it is set as 0. Finally, for malware detection, we
attach the labels “malicious” and “benign” to their constructed
feature vectors, and for familial identification, we attach the
family labels to the corresponding malware samples.
B. Intuitions of Quantitative Metrics
Before introducing the measurement of the metrics, we list
their importance and intuitions:
Stability: The explanation results generated in a critical
security system should be stable. That is, the explanation
features must not be seriously influenced by the fluctuation
techniques used in the explanation approaches. As introduced
before, the local explanation approaches interpret individual
predictions of any given classifier by learning an interpreter
(e.g., linear model) locally around each prediction. Note that
the learned interpreter is trained with a set of generated
similar instances around the given sample; however, since the
distribution of generated instances is not fixed, which would
cause instability for the explanation result. Considering that if
the generated explanations vary a lot between multiple runs for
the same input, the interpreter user would be quite confused
and not trust the explanation results. In other words, if an
explanation approach can really capture the actual reason for
an individual prediction, then the explanation results should
remain the same on similar pre-trained models. Thus, we
regard the stability as the first fundamental property of local
explanation approach.
Robustness: Having an explanation result for individual
prediction is necessary but not enough. The explanation itself
2Android permission control is one of the major Android security
mechanisms. Android permissions are requested by apps before the apps can
use certain system data and features.
3An intent is a bundle of information describing a desired action, including
the data to be acted upon, the category of a component that should perform
the action, and other pertinent instructions.
should also be robust in order to build human trust. Existing
works [30], [31] have demonstrated that the explanation results
might be altered by small systematic perturbations to the input
data while preserving the predicted label. Taking the pathology
diagnosis task as an example, an explanation approach would
suggest that a particular section in an image is important for
the tumor prediction. It would be highly disconcerting that,
if in a remarkably similar image, a very different section is
regarded as the explanation result while the predicted label
remains the same. Weak robustness of explanation approaches
would cause huge damage in critical sceneries. Therefore, we
regard the robustness as another fundamental property of an
explanation approach, which is used to measure how similar
the explanation results are for similar instances.
Effectiveness: The primary goal of an explanation approach
is to find the decision basis for an individual prediction. If
an explanation approach just returns several carefully picked
features that have no relation to the prediction result, it can
easily achieve high stability and robustness scores. However,
such returned features are useless to interpreter users. For
example, in the image classification task, an edge detector is
a classical tool to highlight sharp transitions in an image. It is
untrained and does not depend on any predictive model. It can
just be regarded as a function of a given input image. As a
result, if the edge detector is used as an explanation approach,
it can achieve very high stability and robustness scores
since the output results remain the same [16]. To address
the above problem, we regard the effectiveness as the third
fundamental property, to measure whether the explanation
results are important to the decision-making. In other words,
if the explanation results are really the decision basis for an
individual prediction, then after the removal of such features,
the prediction result would be changed.
C. Measurement of Quantitative Metrics
Similarity calculation between explanations: To measure the
three quantitative metrics, we need to define the similarity
calculation between explanation results that are represented as
feature sets. Considering that the sizes of explanation features
for rule-based methods, i.e., Anchor and LORE, are not fixed,
here we calculate the explanation similarity based on top-k
intersection of the generated feature sets. Specifically, given
two explanation results, ei(g) and ej(g′), and a parameter k,
their similarity is obtained based on the dice coefficient as Eq.
(6),
sim(ei(g), ej(g′), k) = 2 ∗ eki (g) ∩ ekj (g′)∣eki (g)∣ + ∣ekj (g′)∣ (6)
where eki (g) denotes the top-k features of the i-th sample’s
explanation result generated by interpreter g. Note that, for
Anchor and LORE, if the feature number of their explanation
results is less than k, then we would use all their explanation
features. For example, if k is set as 4, the similarity between
the explanation results of LORE and SHAP in Fig. 2 is
calculated based on their top-4 features, i.e., 2 ∗ 1/(4 + 4) =
0.25. However, if k is set as 5, which is bigger than the feature
number of LORE result, we use all its 4 explanation features
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and the top-5 features of SHAP. Therefore, the explanation
similarity between LORE and SHAP is 2 ∗ 1/(4 + 5) = 0.22.
Stability: In our work, the stability of an explanation approach
m, denoted as stb(m,T ), is measured on a target testing
dataset T . Specifically, it is obtained with Eq. (7),
stb(m,T ) = 1∣T ∣ ∗ ∑xi∈T stb(m,xi) (7)
where stb(m,xi) denotes the stability of explanation results
for the sample xi with m on a set of similar pre-trained
models. The similar model set is represented as F = {fp∣1 ≤
p ≤ α}, where α denotes the number of pre-trained models and
it is bigger than two. Note that the models in F are trained
with very similar arguments and they present approximate
performance. Based on F , we can obtain a set of similar
interpreters, represented as G = {gp =m(fp)∣1 ≤ p ≤ α}.
Then stb(m,xi) is obtained by calculating the average dice
coefficient similarity between the explanation results generated
by similar interpreters (i.e., gp, gq ∈ G) as Eq. (8).
stb(m,xi) = 1(α
2
) ∗ ∑gp,gq∈G,p≠q sim(ei(gp), ei(gq), k) (8)
Robustness: When measuring the robustness for malware
analysis task, the samples in the same families can be
regarded as the similar samples since they conduct same
malicious behaviors. Intuitively, for familial identification, the
explanation results of the samples that are predicted in the
same family should be highly similar even if there exists
a bit difference between their feature vectors. Conversely,
the explanation results of the samples in different families
should be highly different. Specifically, the robustness of an
explanation approach m on testing dataset T is calculated as
Eq. (9),
rob(m,T ) = 1∣T ∣ ∗ ∑xi∈T rob(m,xi) (9)
where rob(m,xi) denotes the robustness of explanation results
for the sample xi with m. To calculate rob(m,xi), we first
construct two sets, S(xi) and D(xi), which denote the set of
samples with the same predicted label as xi and the set of
samples with the different predicted label as xi, respectively.
The samples in the two sets are obtained from T . The two
sets are represented as Eq. (10) and Eq. (11).S(xi) = {xj ∣yˆj = yˆi} (10)D(xi) = {xt∣yˆt ≠ yˆi} (11)
After that, we calculate the average explanation similarity
between xi and the samples in the two sets. They are
represented as avg(xi,S(xi)) and avg(xi,D(xi)), and are
obtained with Eq. (12) and Eq. (13). Note that here there is
only one fixed interpreter here, thus we use ei instead of ei(g)
for convenience.
avg(xi,S(xi)) = 1∣S(xi)∣ ∗ ∑xj∈S(xi) sim(ei, ej , k) (12)
avg(xi,D(xi)) = 1∣D(xi)∣ ∗ ∑xt∈D(xi) sim(ei, et, k) (13)
TABLE IV: Performance of malware detection on five
datasets using different classifiers.
Dataset Classifer TPR FPR Precision Recall F-measure
MD-I
MLP 0.9665 0.0041 0.9665 0.9665 0.9665
RF 0.9585 0.0004 0.9967 0.9585 0.9772
KNN 0.9059 0.0063 0.9466 0.9059 0.9258
SVM 0.9442 0.0037 0.9689 0.9442 0.9564
MD-II
MLP 0.9784 0.0249 0.9558 0.9784 0.9670
RF 0.9720 0.0128 0.9765 0.9720 0.9742
KNN 0.9407 0.0314 0.9428 0.9407 0.9417
SVM 0.9440 0.0241 0.9556 0.9440 0.9498
MD-III
MLP 0.9869 0.0304 0.9642 0.9869 0.9754
RF 0.9802 0.0217 0.9740 0.9802 0.9771
KNN 0.9553 0.0399 0.9522 0.9553 0.9537
SVM 0.9703 0.0330 0.9607 0.9703 0.9655
MD-IV
MLP 0.9757 0.0336 0.9633 0.9757 0.9695
RF 0.9777 0.0316 0.9654 0.9777 0.9715
KNN 0.9495 0.0604 0.9342 0.9495 0.9418
SVM 0.9600 0.0557 0.9397 0.9600 0.9497
MD-V
MLP 0.9577 0.0124 0.9731 0.9577 0.9653
RF 0.9631 0.0162 0.9656 0.9631 0.9644
KNN 0.9195 0.0335 0.9281 0.9195 0.9238
SVM 0.9095 0.0320 0.9305 0.9095 0.9199
Finally, rob(m,xi) is calculated as Eq. (14) based
on the numerical difference between avg(xi,S(xi)) and
avg(xi,D(xi)).
rob(m,xi) = avg(xi,S(xi)) − avg(xi,D(xi)) (14)
Effectiveness: In our work, the effectiveness of an explanation
approach m on testing dataset T is calculated as Eq. (15),
eff(m,T ) = 1∣T ∣ ∗ ∑xi∈T eff(m,xi) (15)
where eff(m,xi) denotes the effectiveness of explanation
results for the sample xi with m. To calculate eff(m,xi), we
first construct a new feature vector for the given sample xi by
mutating the feature values according to the top-k explanation
features as Eq. (16). For example, if the value of a target
feature is 1, and it is listed in the explanation results, then in
the new feature vector, its value will be changed to 0.
x∗i =mutate(xi, eki ) (16)
After the mutation of feature vectors, we check whether the
prediction result is changed. Based on Eq. (17) and Eq. (18), if
the prediction result is changed, eff(m,xi) is assigned with
1, indicating that such features are important to the current
decision-making. Otherwise, eff(m,xi) is 0.
eff(m,xi) = {1, yˆ∗i ≠ yˆi
0, yˆ∗i = yˆi (17)
yˆ∗i = f(x∗i ) (18)
IV. STUDY RESULTS
In this section, we first construct the classifier models
and present the performance results for malware analysis
on five datasets introduced in Section IV-A. Then, we
apply five explanation approaches on the constructed models
and obtain the corresponding explanation results, based on
which we present the study results by answering RQ1-RQ6
(Section IV-B-IV-F). Specifically, RQ1 is proposed to prove
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TABLE V: Performance of familial identification on five
datasets using different classifiers.
Dataset Classifer Accuracy Dataset Classifer Accuracy
FI-I
MLP 0.9585
FI-II
MLP 0.9310
RF 0.9760 RF 0.9493
KNN 0.8692 KNN 0.8668
SVM 0.9649 SVM 0.9454
FI-III
MLP 0.9064
FI-IV
MLP 0.7796
RF 0.9150 RF 0.8142
KNN 0.8609 KNN 0.7770
SVM 0.9107 SVM 0.7968
FI-V
MLP 0.8846
RF 0.8990
KNN 0.8115
SVM 0.8944
the significance of our motivation. RQ2-RQ4 are proposed
to conduct a quantitative comparison between the introduced
five explanation approaches with our three metrics. RQ5
is proposed to measure the efficiency of the explanation
approaches in practice. RQ6 is proposed to measure the
generalization ability of our metrics on different classifiers.
A. Malware Analysis Models
Based on the collected dataset and extracted features intro-
duced in Section III-A, we construct a set of classifiers with
multilayer perceptron (MLP), random forest (RF), k-nearest
neighbors (KNN), and support vector machines (SVM). The
classification algorithms are implemented based on sklearn
package. The parameters of the classifiers are mainly selected
using the default values of sklearn package. Specifically, SVM
is trained with the rbf kernel and 1e−7 tolerance. MLP is
trained with 3 layers, where each layer consists of 128 neurons.
In addition, the activation function is relu, the solver is adam,
and the batch size is 200. RF is trained with 100 trees and
a gini criterion. KNN is trained with 10 neighbors, uniform
weights, and 30 leaf size. These algorithms are used in a wide
variety of applications by machine learning engineers across
the world. The performance results for malware analysis,
including malware detection and familial identification, are
listed in Table IV and Table V, where the numbers in bold
denote the best performance in terms of F-measure and
accuracy among the four algorithms.
We can observe that for both malware detection and
familial identification, the constructed classifier models can
achieve fairly good performance, where all the F-measures
are higher than 0.9, and most of the accuracies are higher
than 0.8. Furthermore, RF performs best among the four
algorithms for most datasets except MD-V, since it is an
ensemble classifier that consists of hundreds of trees. However,
the complex tree ensembles are also opaque to us to
understand the inner working. The main reason is that even
the basic decision tree is considered easily understandable and
interpretable for humans; however, the final prediction of RF
is obtained based on hundreds of basic decision trees, which
significantly increases the understanding difficulty of the inner
working [13]. Therefore, RF seems like a black-box to us and
we take it as a hole to conduct the measurement for existing
explanation approaches.
TABLE VI: Average feature numbers of explanation results
for Anchor and LORE on different datasets.
Dataset Anchor LORE Dataset Anchor LORE
MD-I 5.4 3.4 FI-I 6.7 3.2
MD-II 5.4 3.6 FI-II 13.4 3.7
MD-III 2.9 2.9 FI-III 14.3 3.7
MD-IV 3.4 2.9 FI-IV 17.8 3.8
MD-V 4.9 3.0 FI-IV 17.5 4.1
Fig. 3: Consistency of the explanation results for the samples
on different datasets with k from 1 to 20.
B. RQ1: To what extent is the inconsistency for the interpre-
tations with different explanation approaches?
To answer RQ1, we apply the five explanation approaches
on the constructed RF classifier models and obtain the
explanation results for each input sample. For LIME, SHAP,
and LEMNA, we set the parameter k from 1 to 20, and
obtain their corresponding explanation results. For Anchor
and LORE, the average feature numbers of their explanation
results on different datasets are presented in Table VI. We can
observe that the feature numbers of the explanation results
generated for familial identification are generally bigger than
those for malware detection. The main reason is that familial
identification is a multi-class classification problem which
requires more explanation features to interpret the result, while
malware detection is a binary classification problem.
After the generation of explanation results, we calculate the
consistency for each dataset. Specifically, for an input sample,
we calculate the average similarity among the explanation
results generated by the five approaches. Then, the consistency
of a dataset is represented as the average similarity for all
samples. The consistency results with k from 1 to 20 are
presented in Fig. 3. We can observe that the consistency
result increases first and then begins to be stable when k is
higher than 5. Unfortunately, the consistencies in both the MD
datasets and the FI datasets are lower than 0.3, indicating that
the explanation results are quite different even for the same
classifier model and same input.
Answer to RQ1: The consistencies for the interpretations
with different explanation approaches are lower than 0.3,
making analysts hard to select the proper explanation result.
The low consistencies present the significant motivation of
our work.
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Fig. 4: Stability of the five explanation approaches on different malware detection datasets with k from 1 to 20.
Fig. 5: Stability of the five explanation approaches on different familial identification datasets with k from 1 to 20.
C. RQ2: Can the explanation approaches provide stable
explanation results?
To answer RQ2, firstly, we need to construct a set of similar
models. To this end, we only change the tree numbers when
training the RF classifiers while keeping the other arguments
(e..g, min samples leaf=1, and min samples split=2) as the
same. Specifically, for each dataset, we construct five RF
classifiers, of which the tree numbers are 98, 99, 100, and
101. Note that, the total loss of the four classifiers are nearly
the same, so well as their classification performance. Then,
we apply the five explanation approaches on the constructed
classifier models and obtain the corresponding explanation
results. After that, the average stability for each dataset is
calculated according to our proposed stability metric. Fig. 4
and Fig. 5 illustrate the stability of the five approaches on
different datasets with k from 1 to 20. From the two figures
we can observe that:
● For malware detection, LIME shows the best stability
among the five approaches in four datasets (MD-I, MD-
III, MD-IV, and MD-V). In MD-II, the stability of
LIME varies a lot with different k. It increases with the
increment of k and starts to be stable around 0.85 when
K is higher than 7.● For familial identification, the stability of SHAP is similar
to that of LIME, which is around 0.85.● LEMNA presents the worst stability which is lower than
0.4 on average.
Fig. 6 presents an example of the explanation results
generated by LORE. Even with similar classifier models,
the explanation results of LORE are quite different, i.e., the
stability of the samples is only 0.186 when k = 6. Moreover,
for the second classifier (tree number is 99) and the third
classifier (tree number is 100), their explanation results exist
Permission: READ_LOGS = False AND
Permission: ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION = True AND
Permission: RECEIVE_SMS = True AND
Permission: CHANGE_WIFI_STATE = False
Permission: CALL_PHONE = True
API: android.app.Activity:onPrepareOptionMenu = False AND
API: android.telephony.gsm.GsmCellLocation:getLac = False AND
API: android.telephony.TelephonyManager:getLine1Number = False AND
Permission: READ_LOGS = False AND
Permission: ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE = True AND
Permission: GET_TASKS = False
Explanation Results when Tree Number is 98
API: android.telephony.gsm.SmsManager:sendTextMessage = False AND
API: android.telephony.SmsMessage:createFromPdu = True AND
Permission: CHANGE_WIFI_STATE = False
Explanation Results when Tree Number is 99
Permission: CHANGE_WIFI_STATE = False AND
API: android.telephony.gsm.SmsManager:sendTextMessage = True
Explanation Results when Tree Number is 100
Explanation Results when Tree Number is 101
Fig. 6: Four explanation results for a specific app in FI-I
dataset that is classified into the GoldDream family with four
similar RF classifier using LORE.
a conflict, i.e., the value of API sendTextMessage is false
in the former while true in the latter.
Moreover, we also assess the stabilities on four RF
classifiers trained only with different random seeds when the
tree number is fixed as 100. The results are presented in Fig.
7, which demonstrate that when the tree numbers are fixed as
100, the stabilities of the explanation approaches are similar
to those evaluated on the similar models trained with different
tree numbers. LIME and SHAP could also achieve higher
stabilities than the other three approaches.
We also calculate the top 10 features of similar RF
classifiers ranked by information gain. The results are listed
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. X, NO. X, X 9
TABLE VII: Top 10 features ranked by information gain for four similar RF classifier that are constructed with different tree
numbers on the MD-I dataset.
RF tree number=98 RF tree number=99 RF tree number=100 RF tree number=101
READ SMS READ SMS getSubscriberId READ SMS
getSubscriberId getSubscriberId READ SMS getSubscriberId
BOOT COMPLETED BOOT COMPLETED BOOT COMPLETED BOOT COMPLETED
getLine1Number getLine1Number getLine1Number SEND SMS
SEND SMS getDeviceId SEND SMS getLine1Number
getDeviceId SEND SMS READ PHONE STATE getDeviceId
READ PHONE STATE addView getDeviceId READ PHONE STATE
addView CHANGE WIFI STATE RECEIVE SMS addView
RECEIVE SMS READ PHONE STATE CHANGE WIFI STATE RECEIVE SMS
CHANGE WIFI STATE RECEIVE SMS addView CHANGE WIFI STATE
TABLE VIII: Top 10 features ranked by information gain for four similar RF classifier that are constructed with fixed 100
tree number on the MD-I dataset four times.
RF run=1 RF run=2 RF run=3 RF run=4
READ SMS getSubscriberId READ SMS READ SMS
getSubscriberId READ SMS getSubscriberId getSubscriberId
BOOT COMPLETED BOOT COMPLETED BOOT COMPLETED BOOT COMPLETED
getLine1Number getLine1Number getLine1Number SEND SMS
getDeviceId SEND SMS SEND SMS getLine1Number
SEND SMS getDeviceId getDeviceId CHANGE WIFI STATE
CHANGE WIFI STATE RECEIVE SMS RECEIVE SMS getDeviceId
RECEIVE SMS addView CHANGE WIFI STATE RECEIVE SMS
READ PHONE STATE READ PHONE STATE READ PHONE STATE READ PHONE STATE
addView CHANGE WIFI STATE addView addView
Fig. 7: Stability of the five explanation approaches on MD-
I and FI-I datasets with k from 1 to 20 when training RF
classifiers with fixed 100 trees.
in Table VII and Table VIII. Note that in Table VII, the four
similar classifiers are constructed with different tree numbers
on the same training dataset. In Table VIII, the four similar
classifiers are constructed with a fixed 100 tree number on
the same training dataset four times. We can observe that for
the classifiers in both Table VII and Table VIII, their top ten
features are nearly the same. The results demonstrate that these
classifiers present very similar behaviors.
However, the stabilities of Anchor, LORE, and LEMNA
are lower than 0.6, indicating that their explanation results
vary a lot on similar models. Take LEMNA as an example,
when k is selected as 10, there would be less than 3 common
explanation features between multiple runs. In addition, the
stabilities of LIME and SHAP are generally higher than
0.8, which makes them more reliable than other approaches.
We think that the different stabilities are mainly caused by
the explanation approaches themselves rather than the used
learning algorithms.
Answer to RQ2: The ranking of the five explaining
approaches in term of the stability metric is LIME ≥ SHAP> Anchor > LORE > LEMNA. The stabilities of LIME and
SHAP are around 0.85, indicating that their explanation
features hardly change when slightly modify the model.
D. RQ3: Can the explanation approaches provide robust
interpretations?
As introduced before, high robustness indicates that the
samples with the same predicted labels contain similar inter-
pretations, while the samples with different predicted labels
contain different interpretations. For example, in familial
identification, the sample in family geinimi should present
similar interpretations with the samples within the same
family.
To answer RQ3, we only use the interpretations generated
with the RF classifier model, of which the tree number
is 100. After that, we calculate the robustness score for
each explaining method on different datasets. The results are
illustrated in Fig. 8. From the figure we can observe that:● LIME shows the best robustness among the five ap-
proaches on all the datasets. However, with an increase
of k, the robustness of LIME decreases.● The robustness of SHAP differs from the datasets. In FI-I,
it presents similar robustness with LIME. However, in the
other three FI datasets, its robustness scores are around
0.4.● For Anchor, LORE, and LEMNA, their robustness score
are lower than 0.4, and they hardly change with the k
value.
We further investigate the robustness scores in different
families. Due to the page limitation, we only present the
robustness scores for the 36 families in FI-III dataset when k is
set as 5. As listed in Table IX, the first column and the second
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Fig. 8: Robustness of the five explaining methods on different familial identification datasets with k from 1 to 20.
TABLE IX: Robustness score of the interpretations generated by five explanation approaches for different families in FI-III
testing dataset when k = 5.
Malware Family #Sample LIME Anchor LORE SHAP LEMNAS D rob S D rob S D rob S D rob S D rob
adwo 169 0.704 0.222 0.482 0.272 0.077 0.195 0.2 0.099 0.101 0.281 0.117 0.164 0.079 0.034 0.045
airpush 38 0.837 0.234 0.603 0.218 0.079 0.139 0.251 0.132 0.119 0.336 0.171 0.165 0.146 0.05 0.096
anserver 27 0.911 0.244 0.667 0.363 0.051 0.312 0.171 0.095 0.076 0.527 0.089 0.438 0.111 0.041 0.07
basebridge 152 0.892 0.239 0.653 0.311 0.054 0.257 0.163 0.088 0.075 0.526 0.136 0.39 0.094 0.042 0.052
boqx 25 0.689 0.193 0.496 0.183 0.056 0.127 0.207 0.092 0.115 0.309 0.098 0.211 0.138 0.044 0.094
boxer 48 0.865 0.27 0.595 0.301 0.062 0.239 0.238 0.089 0.149 0.648 0.144 0.504 0.187 0.053 0.134
clicker 19 0.616 0.168 0.448 0.244 0.079 0.165 0.228 0.09 0.138 0.323 0.116 0.207 0.050 0.040 0.010
dowgin 425 0.812 0.061 0.751 0.327 0.043 0.284 0.245 0.069 0.176 0.504 0.067 0.437 0.067 0.029 0.038
droiddreamlight 51 0.705 0.293 0.412 0.177 0.088 0.089 0.417 0.138 0.279 0.578 0.141 0.437 0.193 0.029 0.164
droidkungfu 368 0.815 0.256 0.559 0.349 0.092 0.257 0.171 0.106 0.065 0.404 0.102 0.302 0.104 0.039 0.065
droidsheep 7 0.781 0.108 0.673 0.057 0.047 0.01 0.285 0.112 0.173 0.885 0.063 0.822 0.238 0.032 0.206
fakeangry 8 0.686 0.101 0.585 0.171 0.061 0.11 0.158 0.117 0.041 0.8 0.097 0.703 0.060 0.030 0.030
fakedoc 74 0.641 0.023 0.618 0.235 0.036 0.199 0.155 0.088 0.067 0.729 0.068 0.661 0.032 0.032 0.000
fakeinst 752 0.94 0.287 0.653 0.427 0.074 0.353 0.242 0.068 0.174 0.486 0.069 0.417 0.195 0.041 0.154
fakeplay 22 0.791 0.122 0.669 0.199 0.088 0.111 0.306 0.067 0.239 0.8 0.097 0.703 0.347 0.032 0.315
geinimi 53 0.749 0.081 0.668 0.137 0.047 0.09 0.142 0.076 0.066 0.736 0.076 0.66 0.042 0.033 0.009
gingermaster 193 0.817 0.316 0.501 0.401 0.107 0.294 0.277 0.096 0.181 0.407 0.128 0.279 0.156 0.031 0.125
golddream 40 0.768 0.205 0.563 0.113 0.045 0.068 0.142 0.096 0.046 0.547 0.124 0.423 0.048 0.031 0.017
hongtoutou 23 0.762 0.234 0.528 0.192 0.086 0.106 0.269 0.099 0.17 0.528 0.187 0.341 0.242 0.038 0.204
iconosys 77 0.956 0.371 0.585 0.425 0.117 0.308 0.261 0.101 0.16 0.713 0.151 0.562 0.107 0.034 0.073
imlog 21 0.872 0.182 0.69 0.135 0.053 0.082 0.474 0.132 0.342 0.892 0.147 0.745 0.139 0.042 0.097
jsmshider 11 0.769 0.142 0.627 0.105 0.05 0.055 0.265 0.057 0.208 0.825 0.109 0.716 0.389 0.048 0.341
kmin 124 0.754 0.232 0.522 0.204 0.056 0.148 0.217 0.061 0.156 0.597 0.105 0.492 0.056 0.031 0.025
kuguo 179 0.842 0.227 0.615 0.377 0.074 0.303 0.285 0.086 0.199 0.282 0.101 0.181 0.564 0.041 0.523
lovetrap 10 0.787 0.104 0.683 0.088 0.049 0.039 0.157 0.122 0.035 0.68 0.157 0.523 0.062 0.034 0.028
mobiletx 41 0.851 0.214 0.637 0.175 0.071 0.104 0.226 0.088 0.138 1 0.125 0.875 0.098 0.024 0.074
pjapps 41 0.748 0.356 0.392 0.281 0.078 0.203 0.222 0.105 0.117 0.698 0.137 0.561 0.119 0.029 0.090
plankton 448 0.874 0.285 0.589 0.415 0.067 0.348 0.331 0.091 0.24 0.214 0.109 0.105 0.393 0.028 0.365
smskey 56 0.532 0.223 0.309 0.259 0.079 0.18 0.259 0.081 0.178 0.477 0.09 0.387 0.157 0.047 0.110
smsreg 75 0.758 0.255 0.503 0.184 0.068 0.116 0.167 0.102 0.065 0.307 0.105 0.202 0.035 0.038 -0.003
steek 10 0.831 0.011 0.82 0.08 0.032 0.048 0.346 0.111 0.235 0.8 0.093 0.707 0.040 0.017 0.023
utchi 143 0.977 0.133 0.844 0.479 0.049 0.43 0.388 0.107 0.281 0.921 0.109 0.812 0.196 0.038 0.158
waps 386 0.875 0.251 0.624 0.345 0.066 0.279 0.184 0.101 0.083 0.272 0.093 0.179 0.170 0.034 0.136
youmi 57 0.768 0.226 0.542 0.274 0.079 0.195 0.254 0.112 0.142 0.23 0.133 0.097 0.232 0.031 0.201
yzhc 25 0.627 0.166 0.461 0.13 0.048 0.082 0.327 0.096 0.231 0.753 0.118 0.635 0.117 0.054 0.063
zitmo 15 0.701 0.083 0.618 0.093 0.032 0.061 0.222 0.073 0.149 0.516 0.085 0.431 0.164 0.046 0.118
Average 0.840 0.229 0.611 0.340 0.069 0.271 0.242 0.089 0.154 0.452 0.099 0.354 0.179 0.035 0.144
column list the family name and the size of corresponding
test samples, respectively. Columns 3-14 list the S , D, and
rob for each family with different explaining methods. Here,S and D denote the average value of the avg(xi, (S(xi)))
and avg(xi, (D(xi))) for all samples with a specific family,
respectively. In addition, rob = S −D. From Table IX, we can
observe that:
● For LIME, the highest S is 0.977 for the utchi family,
and the lowest S can also achieve 0.532, which is higher
than all the S in Anchor and LORE. The average value
of S is 0.840, indicating that when k = 5, more than 4
explanation features are same for the samples within the
same family.● For the D metric, most D for Anchor, LORE, and
LEMNA is lower than 0.1, indicating that the expla-
nations generated by such three approaches are quite
different. Even the avg(xi, (D(xi))) for LIME is around
0.229, we think it is an acceptable value since most mal-
ware samples would have common malicious behaviors.● Although the average rob value of SHAP is only 0.354,
it differs a lot with families. For example, the rob can
achieve 0.875 in mobiletx family while is only 0.097 in
youmi family.● For LEMNA, S and D of some families (e.g., fakedoc
and smsreg) are nearly the same, indicating that this
approach cannot capture the core differences between
malware families.
Based on the above results, we can identify that nearly all
the approaches are fragile to be attacked by small perturbations
to the input sample while not changing the label. Here we use
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Permission: PACKAGE_ADDED = False AND
Permission: SEND_SMS = True
API: android.app.PendingIntent:getService = False AND
API: android.content.ContextWrapper:registerReceiver = False AND
API: android.net.NetworkInfo:getType = False AND
Permission: GET_TASKS = False AND
Permission: CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
Permission: PACKAGE_ADDED = False AND
Permission: SEND_SMS = True AND
API: android.telephony.TelephonyManager:getSubscriberId = False
Explanation Results of LORE for a fakeinst sample 
Explanation Results of LORE for a different fakeinst sample
Explanation Results of LORE for a smsreg sample
Fig. 9: Explanation results for two fakeinst samples and one
smsreg sample in FI-III datast using LORE.
three samples to show the frailness of LORE, in which two
samples present similar malicious behaviors and are classified
into the same fakeinst family. The difference between the
input feature vectors is regarded as the small perturbations.
The third sample is classified into the smsreg family. The
explanation results generated by LORE are presented in Fig.
9. The results demonstrate that for the two samples in the
same family, their explanation similarity is 0. However, for
the first and the third samples, even their labels are different,
their explanation similarity can achieve 0.8.
Answer to RQ3: The ranking of the five explaining
approaches in term of the robustness metric is LIME> SHAP > Anchor > LORE > LEMNA. Moreover, the
robustness scores of these explanation approaches are
not high enough, indicating that their interpretations for
samples with same labels are easy to be altered.
E. RQ4: Can the explanation approaches provide effective
interpretations?
The interpretation effectiveness is the most important
property of an explanation approach when applying in practice.
In our work, the effectiveness is measured by whether the
predicted label is changed after the mutation of explanation
features. To answer RQ4, we first mutate the feature values
of the given feature vector. Then we feed the new feature
vector to the original classifier model and obtain its new
predicted label. Finally, we compare the original predicted
label and the new predicted label to check the effectiveness
of the explanation features. We evaluate the effectiveness
of the five approaches on different datasets. The results are
illustrated in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, from which we can draw
three conclusions:● On the whole, for both the two tasks, LIME shows the
best effectiveness among the five approaches. After the
mutation for the explanation results generated by LIME,
nearly all the predicted labels are changed.● With the increase of k, the effectiveness of LIME, SHAP,
and LEMNA increase. However, for Anchor and LORE,
their effectiveness start to be stable when k >= 5. The
main reason is that most of explanation feature size of
Anchor and LORE are less than 5, resulting the no change
of predicted label with higher k values.
● The effectiveness of the same approach differs with
datasets. For example, LORE performs better than An-
chor, SHAP, and LEMNA in MD-II, MD-III, MD-IV
and MD-V. However, it performs worse than Anchor and
SHAP in all the four FI datasets.
We further investigate the generated effective explanation
features, which denote the explanation features that can change
the predicted label after the mutation of feature values. For
example, when k = 5, the number of explanation feature is 5.
If the predicted label is changed after the mutation of the first
explanation feature, then the effective explanation feature set
contains only one feature. If the predicted label is not changed
after the mutation of all the explanation features, then the
effective explanation feature set is an empty set.
Table X lists the ranking of the effective explanation
features generated by five approaches on different MD datasets
when k = 5. Note that for the API features in this table,
we only use their function name due to the page limit.
The weight value in the table denotes the significance of
each feature to the malware detection. It is obtained based
on the percent of malware samples in each dataset that
contain the corresponding effective explanation feature. For
example, in MD-I dataset, by applying LIME, the weight
of API getSubscriberId is 0.71, indicating that the
feature occurs in the effective explanation feature set of
71% samples in the MD-I testing dataset. It is worth noting
that in MD-I dataset, the effectiveness of LIME is also
0.71 when k = 5 according to Fig. 10(a), indicating that
for the malware samples in MD-I testing dataset, the API
getSubscriberId is the necessary feature to be mutated
in order to change the predicted label.
From the table we find that even the listed top-5 features
for different explaining methods are similar in the same
dataset, their weights are quite different. For example, in
MD-IV dataset, the permission READ_PHONE_STATE occurs
first for LIME, Anchor, LORE and LEMNA. Its weight in
LIME is 0.971, which is much higher than those in the other
three approaches. The result demonstrates that all the three
explanation approaches agree that READ_PHONE_STATE is
the most important feature for malware detection in this
dataset. However, the ability of LIME to capture the true
malicious behaviors is better than others.
The above results demonstrate that LIME performs best
among the five explanation approaches in terms of the
effectiveness metric. We further conduct a comparison be-
tween the top-ranked features of LIME and some malware
families, e.g., fakeinst, svpeng, and slembunk, to check whether
the generated explanation features can depict the malicious
behaviors identified by the authors of dataset-V (i.e., AMD
dataset [23]). The malicious behaviors identified by humans
and the corresponding explanation features generated by LIME
are listed in Table XI. The results demonstrate that LIME
can well capture the essential malicious behaviors of the
malware samples. Since the malware samples in different
malware families would conduct some similar behaviors
such as sending messages, the SMS-related features are
always generated as explanation features. However, for some
families that contain unique malicious behaviors, they will
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Fig. 10: Effectiveness of the five explaining methods on different malware detection datasets with k from 1 to 20.
Fig. 11: Effectiveness of the five explaining methods on different familial identification datasets with k from 1 to 20.
TABLE X: Ranking of the effective explanation features generated by five explanation approaches on different malware
detection datasets when k = 5.
LIME Anchor LORE SHAP LEMNA
Feature Weight Feature Weight Feature Weight Feature Weight Feature Weight
MD-I
getSubscriberId 0.71 READ SMS 0.257 getLine1Number 0.141 READ SMS 0.174 READ SMS 0.032
BOOT COMPLETED 0.677 getSubscriberId 0.249 CHANGE WIFI STATE 0.101 getSubscriberId 0.153 getSubscriberId 0.027
READ SMS 0.548 BOOT COMPLETED 0.179 READ SMS 0.086 READ SMS 0.056 getDeviceId 0.025
getDeviceId 0.406 READ PHONE STATE 0.112 getSubscriberId 0.085 getLac 0.035 READ LOGS 0.018
addView 0.358 SEND SMS 0.092 getDeviceId 0.071 getLine1Number 0.029 getLine1Number 0.017
MD-II
SEND SMS 0.521 READ PHONE STATE 0.181 getDeviceId 0.194 getDeviceId 0.172 READ PHONE STATE 0.122
READ PHONE STATE 0.463 SEND SMS 0.139 READ PHONE STATE 0.185 SEND SMS 0.156 SEND SMS 0.074
addView 0.349 getLine1Number 0.091 addView 0.094 READ PHONE STATE 0.082 WRITE CONTACTS 0.042
READ SMS 0.195 getSubscriberId 0.086 SEND SMS 0.092 getLine1Number 0.077 ACCESS NETWORK STATE 0.040
getDeviceId 0.139 addView 0.083 getType 0.067 getSubscriberId 0.062 ACCESS WIFI STATE 0.039
MD-III
READ PHONE STATE 0.681 SEND SMS 0.106 READ PHONE STATE 0.388 SEND SMS 0.077 READ PHONE STATE 0.275
getSubscriberId 0.445 READ PHONE STATE 0.079 getType 0.185 getSubscriberId 0.058 SEND SMS 0.053
getDeviceId 0.277 RECEIVE SMS 0.069 getDeviceId 0.114 READ PHONE STATE 0.044 READ EXTERNAL STORSGE 0.042
SEND SMS 0.22 addView 0.061 SEND SMS 0.064 getDeviceId 0.044 WRITE CONTACTS 0.031
getType 0.056 getDeviceId 0.055 GET ACCOUNTS 0.051 sendTextMessage 0.025 ACCESS WIFI STATE 0.024
MD-IV
READ PHONE STATE 0.971 READ PHONE STATE 0.299 READ PHONE STATE 0.571 getDeviceId 0.364 READ PHONE STATE 0.386
COARSE LOCATION 0.48 COARSE LOCATION 0.143 getDeviceId 0.22 getMacAddress 0.313 WRITE SETTINGS 0.115
getDeviceId 0.428 getLine1Number 0.064 getMacAddress 0.103 COARSE LOCATION 0.271 BOOT COMPLETED 0.087
getMacAddress 0.057 SEND SMS 0.048 ACCESS WIFI STATE 0.088 getLine1Number 0.091 READ EXTERNAL STORSGE 0.035
ACCESS WIFI STATE 0.023 getSimOperatorName 0.037 COARSE LOCATION 0.073 SEND SMS 0.089 getDeviceId 0.015
MD-V
READ PHONE STATE 0.323 getLine1Number 0.095 READ PHONE STATE 0.264 SEND SMS 0.192 READ PHONE STATE 0.079
SEND SMS 0.202 getSubscriberId 0.085 getDeviceId 0.073 getLine1Number 0.154 SEND SMS 0.029
getLine1Number 0.141 SEND SMS 0.076 getLine1Number 0.071 BOOT COMPLETED 0.151 BOOT COMPLETED 0.023
getSubscriberId 0.096 BOOT COMPLETED 0.069 getSubscriberId 0.067 RECEIVE SMS 0.093 WRITE SETTINGS 0.017
getDeviceId 0.046 CHANGE WIFI STATE 0.037 SEND SMS 0.044 getSubscriberId 0.049 getDeviceId 0.012
contain some different explanation features. For example,
fakeinst samples usually install on other apps; thus, the
INSTALL PACKAGES permission is their unique feature
compared with the svpeng and slembunk samples.
Answer to RQ4: For malware detection, the ranking of
the five explanation approaches in term of the effectiveness
metric is LIME > LORE > Anchor ≥ SHAP > LEMNA.
For familial identification, the ranking is LIME > SHAP >
Anchor > LORE > LEMNA. Furthermore, the identified
effective explanation features can help us obtain the
knowledge of most representative malicious behaviors for
malware analysis.
F. RQ5: Can the explanation approaches handle a great deal
of samples?
To answer RQ5, we evaluate the runtime overhead for the
explanation approaches on different datasets. The results are
listed in Table XII, where the number denotes the average
seconds required to generate the explanation results for each
sample. Three observations are obtained from Table XII.
● First, Anchor and LORE require much more time than
LIME, SHAP, and LEMNA. For example, in FI-IV
dataset, LORE and Anchor need 216.4 and 156.1 seconds
on average to generate the interpretations while LIME,
SHAP and LEMNA only need less than 3 seconds.
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Fig. 12: Evaluation results on SVM
classifiers using three metrics.
Fig. 13: Evaluation results on KNN
classifiers using three metrics.
Fig. 14: Evaluation results on MLP
classifiers using three metrics.
TABLE XI: Malicious behaviors identified by humans and
their corresponding explanation features generated by LIME.
Malicious Behaviors Explanation Features
The fakeinst samples generally appear to be
installers for various benign apps. While active,
the malware samples send SMS messages to
premium rate phone numbers.
getOrininatingAddress;
createFromPdu;
RECEIVE SMS;
SEND SMS;
INSTALL PACKAGES
The svpeng samples belong to the type of banking
trojan and ransomware. If its C&C server sends a
specific command, it will lock the infected device
by using the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW permission.
SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW;
READ CONTACTS;
getRunningTasks
slembunk samples schedule a java.lang.Runnable
every 4 seconds to monitor the current running activity.
Once the activity belongs to a certain banking app, it will
overlay a phishing window. Moreover, these samples
also forward phone calls and SMS from bank numbers.
RECEIVE SMS;
CALL PHONE;
onStartCommand;
getMessageBody;
SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW
TABLE XII: Runtime overhead (second) per sample for five
explanation approaches on different datasets.
Dataset LIME Anchor LORE SHAP LEMNA
MD-I 0.6 51.8 71.3 0.1 2.3
MD-II 0.8 56.6 103.7 1.1 2.3
MD-III 0.5 60.1 109.6 2.4 2.4
MD-IV 0.8 126.7 167.1 4.5 2.1
MD-V 1.1 63.4 85.2 1.7 2.6
FI-I 0.7 70.5 79.9 2.6 2.4
FI-II 1.1 97.1 138.2 2.6 2.4
FI-III 1.0 115.8 182.3 2.1 2.5
FI-IV 1.0 156.1 216.4 2.6 2.6
FI-V 1.6 140.9 177.3 2.8 2.6
● Second, with the increase of the dataset size, the runtime
overhead of Anchor and LORE increase. However, the
runtime overhead of LIME, SHAP, and LEMNA hardly
change.● Third, the runtime overhead of generating explanation
results for familial identification is generally higher than
that for malware detection.
In summary, for malware analysis, LIME shows the best
efficiency among the five approaches. SHAP and LEMNA
present an acceptable efficiency. However, for Anchor and
LORE, they are not suitable to be applied in malware
analysis due to their high cost in extracting and reducing
the interpretation rules. Specifically, Anchor and LORE cost
nearly two months to generate the explanation results for our
datasets.
Answer to RQ5: For malware analysis, the low efficiency
of LIME, SHAP, and LEMNA make them be able to handle
a large scale of malware samples while Anchor and LORE
are not suitable in this domain.
G. RQ6: Can our metrics be evaluated on other classifiers?
To answer RQ6, we evaluate the proposed metrics using
three other classifiers (i.e., KNN, SVM, and MLP). Note that
when evaluating the stability metric, we need to construct a set
of similar models. Specifically, for KNN, we vary the number
of neighbors from 8 to 11. For SVM, we vary the tolerance
parameter as 1e−7, 2e−7, 3e−7 and 4e−7. For MLP, we vary
the iteration numbers from 98 to 101.
The results are presented in Fig. 12, Fig. 13, and Fig. 14.
From the figures, we can observe that on different learning
classifiers, the metric values for the same explanation approach
are different. For example, the average stabilities of LIME
and SHAP on SVM are much higher than those on MLP.
However, even the metric values differ with classifiers; the
comparison results among the five explanation approaches on
the three metrics are nearly the same as those on the RF
classifier. For stability, both LIME and SHAP can achieve
good performance. For robustness, LIME can only perform
well when k is less than 5. The other four approaches present
weak robustness scores on all the classifiers. For effectiveness,
LIME performs the best no matter what the classifier is. In
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summary, for malware analysis, LIME seems to be the most
suited explanation approach.
Answer to RQ6: For malware analysis,our proposed three
metrics can also be evaluated on other classifiers.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND THREATS TO VALIDITY
A. Discussions about the results
In this section we discuss some insights about the evaluation
results according to the designs of the five approaches.
For LIME, it builds a local linear model for an individual
sample x to approximate the boundary of prediction. To this
end, it weights different perturbed samples according to the
distances between x and the perturbed samples. In this way,
LIME can, to some extent, restrict the domain potentially, from
which the stability and the effectiveness of explanation results
are relatively better [32].
Anchor provides explanations in the form of a set of rules
extracted incrementally from perturbations through a multi-
armed bandit. However, the rules generated by Anchor are very
specific, and the average coverage is low. It is likely to ignore
the implicit impact of features that are less salient comparing
with LIME, which may result in a loss of the explanation
accuracy.
LORE obtains the explanation results based on the decision
tree. However, because of the inherent instability of the
decision tree, LORE presents low performance. Under the
condition of the same model and parameters, the results of
any two independent experiments are considerably different,
indicating that two random perturbations produce almost
different trees. Moreover, the correlation between features is
ignored in the decision tree, which may be one of the reasons
for its low performance.
For a certain feature, SHAP computes the shap values
based on the average prediction differences of all possible
feature combinations when its value flipped from 0 to 1. This
process satisfies three predefined desirable properties, local
accuracy, missingness, and consistency that are grounded in
game-theoretic principles. Therefore, SHAP presents relatively
higher stability and effectiveness than other approaches.
LEMNA creates the mixture regression model to better
approximate a non-linear decision boundary according to
fused lasso. During the calculation, the model is presented
in the form of a probability distribution, and parameters
are estimated by using the EM (Expectation-Maximization)
algorithm. However, the EM algorithm is sensitive to initial
values, which is chosen randomly for each iteration. As a
result, when we take a single instance for interpretation,
consistency between explaining results is hard to guarantee,
which might lead to the poor performance of LEMNA.
Note that the robustness of all the above approaches is weak,
which might be ignored by their designers. In recent years,
some work can successfully attack explanation approaches.
The testing and enhancing of explanation robustness would
be a significant direction in future work. To mitigate the
problem, we think it is a promising way to combine the
losing function of evaluation metrics when constructing the
interpreters. For example, to construct an interpreter that has
a high effectiveness score, designers can consider the label
changing probability after feature mutation during the training
phase.
B. Threats to Internal Validity
Features provided by FeatureSmith. We rely on the features
provided by FeatureSmith in our work. The features are
extracted from scientific papers. However, four years latter,
the feature set might be outdated or incomplete, missing or
incorrect features would make the generated interpretations
biased. For example, if the malware samples produced
in recent years contain new malicious behaviors that are
implemented with novel API calls, then the explanation
approaches cannot capture such behaviors even they have
good performance in old datasets. In future work, we plan
to reproduce the FeatureSmith in more published knowledge,
not only the scientific papers published in recent years but also
the technical blogs that are related with Android malware.
Limitation of Ground Truth Explanation Results. Different
like the annotations generated by bounding box [33] and
semantic segmentation [34] in computer vision-related tasks,
and the rational annotations [35] used in natural language
processing, it is a time-consuming and error-prone job to
manually construct ground truth annotations in Android
malware analysis. In practice, even expert analysts cannot
accurately identify all the malicious behaviors of malware
samples. Although the authors of AMD dataset provide some
descriptions about the malicious behaviors of each malware
family, it is still a challenge to obtain the ground truth
malicious behaviors for each sample, thus we cannot directly
assess the quality of a single explanation result and compare
the interpretability of the explanation approaches. However,
our three general metrics measured on thousands of malware
samples can assess the explanation approaches at a certain
degree and give perceptual intuition to users which approach
is more suitable.
C. Threats to External Validity
Study on other explanation approaches. It is worth noting
that our goal in this work is not to exhaustively evaluate
all prior explanation approaches, but rather to highlight how
our metrics apply to specific cases of interest, i.e., malware
detection and familial identification. Moreover, we believe that
our proposed three metrics can also be used to conduct the
sanity check for other explanation approaches since the metrics
are the fundamental properties that an explanation approaches
need to contain. The key point to measure other types of
explanation approaches, e.g., model-specific approaches, is
to select a proper scene that can construct the common
classifier models. For example, the comparison between the
CNN specific explanation approaches can be well conducted
in the image classification scene.
Study on other domains. Malware analysis is an important
problem that has close relations with our daily life and
no previous work has been done for the measurement of
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explanation approaches in such critical domain. We believe
that our metrics can be generalized on other important
domains such as sentiment analysis and image classification.
The main difference between these domains is the feature
representations. For malware analysis, the feature space is
usually defined by analysts and they are represented as a
numeric feature vector. However, for sentiment analysis, the
features are generally the embedding vectors of words, and for
image classification, the features are generally the pixel matrix.
The key point to apply our metrics on other domains is replace
the similarity calculation between the explanation features. For
example, the explanation features of sentiment analysis are
the sensitive words that have most impact to the decision-
making. Thus, the similarity calculation should consider the
words with close semantics. We think cosine distance between
the embedding vectors obtained by WORD2VEC is a promising
way. It is worth noting that the ranking results concluded for
malware analysis domain might be different from those in
other domains.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Android Malware Analysis
Existing Android malware analysis approaches mainly rely
on machine learning methods, of which the features can
be categorized into two categories, string-based features
and graph-based features. String-based features are mainly
composed of request permissions, intents, API calls and other
components of the Android operation system. Arp et al. [20]
proposed Drebin, which performs a broad static analysis,
gathering as many features of an app as possible such as
permissions, API calls, and strings in Dalvik code. These
features are then embedded in a joint vector space for Android
malware analysis. Aafer et al. [36] proposed DroidAPIMiner,
which extracts five different types of API calls as features.
Graph-based features are proposed to improve the robustness
of features while retaining the program semantics. Zhang
et al. [37] proposed DroidSIFT, which builds dependency
graph databases and produces graph-based feature vectors by
performing graph similarity queries. Fan et al. [38] proposed
GefDroid, which constructs SRA, a novel feature that depicts
the similarity relationships between the structural roles of
sensitive API call nodes in subgraphs, based on which they
can perform a quick familial analysis.
B. Interpretable Explanation Approaches
In recent years, many explanation approaches have been
proposed to provide interpretability for black-box models,
using techniques based on local approximation, input pertur-
bation, and back propagation.
Local approximation based explanation approaches are
based on the assumption that the machine learning predictions
around the neighborhood of a given input can be approximated
by an interpretable white-box model. The five typical local
explanation approaches are introduced before [8]–[12].
The input perturbation based approaches follow the phi-
losophy that the contribution of a feature can be determined
by measuring how prediction score changes when the feature
is altered. Fong and Vedaldi [39] proposed a meaningful
perturbation approach, which learns a saliency mask by
blurring an image to minimize the probabilities of its target
class. The saliency mask is the part of an image most
responsible for a classifier decision. Li et al. [40] proposed a
general methodology for interpreting neural network decisions
by analyzing the effect of erasing particular representations.
By analyzing the harm and the benefit the erasure does, the
method provides a way to offer interpretable explanations and
conduct error analysis on neural model decisions.
Back propagation based approaches calculate the gradi-
ent [41], or its variants, of a particular output with respect
to the input using back propagation to derive the contribution
of features. Shrikumar et al. [42] proposed DeepLIFT, which
computes importance scores based on explaining the difference
of the output from some “reference” output in terms of
differences of the inputs from their “reference” inputs.
Smilkov et al. [43] proposed SmoothGrad, which takes an
image of interest, samples similar images by adding noise to
the image, then takes the average of the resulting sensitivity
maps for each sampled image as explanation results.
C. Measurement of Explanation Approaches
While many explanation approaches have been proposed,
however, several works have demonstrated that existing
explanation approaches are easy to be attacked [30], [31].
Slack et al. [44] developed an approach that exploits the
fact that LIME and SHAP are perturbation-based, to create
a scaffolding around any given biased black box classifier
in such a way that its predictions on input data distribution
remain biased, but its behavior on the perturbed data points
is controlled to make the explanations look completely
innocuous. Zhang et al. [45] conducted a systematic study on
the security of existing explanation methods and they proposed
ADV 2, a general class of attacks that generate adversarial
inputs not only misleading target DNNs but also deceiving
their coupled interpretation models.
Therefore, it is still an open question how to thoroughly
validate the reliability of existing explanation approaches. In
addition to the work [16]–[18] introduce before.
The most related work is proposed by Warnecke et al. [46],
which is done without contacts in parallel. Both of this work
and ours focus on the evaluation of explanation approaches on
security-related domains. Moreover, three common approaches
are evaluated, i.e., LIME, SHAP, and LEMNA, and three
similar measurement metrics are proposed, including stability,
robustness, and efficiency. However, even both the two
research groups have apparently worked on the same research
question in parallel, there are three main differences. First,
Even both [46] and our work focus on Android malware
analysis domain. We evaluate on two tasks, i.e., malware
detection and familial identification, while they only consider
the former. Moreover, we conduct our evaluation on five
different malware datasets which are constructed in different
years, while paper [46] uses two datasets. For the robustness
metric, the paper [46] assesses this metric based on the existing
literature. They conclude that the explanation approaches are
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not robust just in a qualitative way, not in a quantitative way,
as our definition. Third, we propose the effectiveness metric
while [46] does not. The effectiveness is another fundamental
property used to measure whether the explanation results are
important to the decision-making.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, motivated by the inconsistency of explanation
results generated by different explanation approaches, we eval-
uate their reliability problem in Android malware analysis. We
first propose principled guidelines to assess the quality of the
explanation approaches by designing three quantitative metrics
to measure their stability, robustness, and effectiveness. Then
we conduct a sanity check of five explanation approaches
in Android malware analysis based on our proposed metrics.
The results demonstrate that our metrics can not only assess
the explanation approaches but also can help us obtain the
knowledge of most representative malicious behaviors for
malware analysis.
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